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FAMILY LAW
Elizabeth P. Coughter *
Ronald R. Tweel **

I. INTRODUCTION

Developments in Virginia family law over the last year have
created uncertainty as to a number of significant issues. Of these,
the most significant is the enforceability of self-executing child
support provisions in a divorced couple's property settlement
agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia
Court of Appeals appear to be at odds on this issue. In Riggins v.
O'Brien,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the court of appeals in declining to give effect to a provision modifying child
support found in the parties' property settlement agreement.2
During the same period of time, however, the Virginia Court of
Appeals issued the decision of Shoup v. Shoup,3 which, in its rehearing en banc, upheld a self-executing child support provision
found in the parties' property settlement agreement.4 These two
decisions are not entirely consistent in their reasoning and will
be discussed below.5
Significant legislative amendments this past year include
interlocutory appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals,6 gross
income adjustments for self-employment taxes in child support
* Member, Michie, Hamlett, Lowry, Rasmussen & Tweel, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia. B.A., 1975, University of Virginia; J.D., 1982, University of Richmond School of
Law.
** Member, Michie, Hamlett, Lowry, Rasmussen & Tweel, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia. B.S., 1968, Hampden-Sydney College, magna cum laude; J.D., 1971, University of
Virginia School of Law.
1. 263 Va. 444, 559 S.E.2d 673 (2002).
2. Id. at 449, 559 S.E.2d at 676.
3. 37 Va. App. 240, 556 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 2001).
4. Id. at 254, 556 S.E.2d at 790.
5. See infra Part II.A.1.

6.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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calculations,7 admissibility of therapy records of parties in a custody or visitation proceeding,' juvenile court authority to order
psychological or custodial evaluation and drug testing,9 and
expansion of the definition of marital rape.' °
Frankly, this was not a legislative session that can be considered significant in the area of family law. Often, the Virginia Bar
Association ("VBA") Coalition Committee on Family Law Legislation ("Committee") considers it a major success to defeat bills that
it considers to be inappropriate." This happened again this session when the Committee helped to prevent passage of a bill that
would have enacted a rebuttable presumption that both parents
should share equally in child rearing responsibilities, 2 two bills
that would have required the court to consider the "parental alienation syndrome,"'3 and a bill that would have substituted the
term "managerial parent" for "joint custody and sole custody" and
repealed the definition of joint custody. 4 The Committee also defeated a bill requiring a party issuing a subpoena to a teacher
compelling him/her to testify at a custody or visitation hearing to
assure that the testimony is at a time that does not interfere with
the teacher's teaching schedule. 5 Similar to past legislative sessions, there were no bills passed dealing with equitable distribution or grounds of divorce.

7. Id. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
8. Id. § 20-124.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
9. Id. § 16.1-278.15 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
10. Id. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
11. For additional information about the VBA Coalition Committee on Family Law
Legislation, see the VBA's Web site at http://www.vba.org/section/domestic.htm.
12. H.B. 831, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); S.B. 277, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2002).
13. H.B. 417, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002); H.B. 1132, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2002).
14. H.B. 590, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002).
15. S.B. 545, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002).
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II. CHILD SUPPORT

A. Case Law
1. Parental Agreements to Modify Support
Family law practitioners in Virginia breathed a sigh of relief
when the Virginia Court of Appeals rendered its en banc decision
in Shoup v. Shoup.16 A mere three months later, however, the
Supreme Court of Virginia rendered its decision in Riggins v.
O'Brien, 7 leading to uncertainty as to the validity of selfexecuting agreements in child support provisions. Shoup approved the common practice of incorporating self-executing provisions in divorce agreements to modify child support when future
events occur such as a child reaching the age of majority.'" In
Riggins, on the other hand, the court failed to enforce a selfexecuting provision. 9 The inconsistency in these decisions turns
on the specific language of the agreement involved.
In Shoup, the original appeal2" affirmed the trial court's ruling
that the parties' written agreement concerning child support
which had been incorporated into the final decree of divorce was
void and unenforceable. 2' However, the rehearing en banc reversed these decisions.22 The parties had a "Custody, Support and
Property Settlement Agreement" ("Agreement") which provided,
in part, that child support would be reduced upon the emancipation of each child; that is, when a child died, married, became
self-supporting, reached age eighteen or otherwise became emancipated, or graduated from high school at the age of nineteen.23
Upon any change of circumstances, the Agreement provided that
the statutory child support guidelines found in Virginia Code sec-

16. 37 Va. App. 240, 556 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 2001) (en banc).
17. 263 Va. 444, 559 S.E.2d 673 (2002).
18. 37 Va. App. at 254, 556 S.E.2d at 790 (en banc).
19. Riggins, 263 Va. at 449, 559 S.E.2d at 676.
20. Shoup v. Shoup, 34 Va. App. 347, 542 S.E.2d 9 (Ct. App. 2001).

21. Id. at 356, 542 S.E.2d at 14.
22.

Shoup, 37 Va. App. at 254, 556 S.E.2d at 790 (en banc).

23. Id. at 245 n.1, 556 S.E.2d at 785 n.1 (en banc).
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tion 20-108.2 would be followed. 24 This Agreement was incorporated in the parties' final divorce decree.
The parties had three children. 26 When the eldest child graduated from high school, the husband unilaterally reduced his child
support payments by one-third. When the parties' second child
reached the age of eighteen, the husband once again unilaterally
reduced child support by another one-third.2" The wife did not object to these reductions until she filed her petition for a rule to
show cause for the husband's failure to pay the entire sum of
child support as originally stated in the Agreement.29
The trial court held that the provision that provided for modification of child support upon emancipation of each child was void
and reasoned that the divorce decree could not be modified by the
parties without court approval.3"
Upon the en banc review, the court of appeals addressed "foundational principles of Virginia divorce law regarding the divorce
court's jurisdiction to determine child support and the rights of
parties to resolve those issues by agreement."31 The court recognized that the best interests of the children are of paramount importance and the award must be based upon contemporaneous
events.3 2 By the same token, parents have a "well-established and
broad right to reach legally binding and enforceable agreements"
concerning child support.33 Such an agreement cannot be disregarded by a trial court in setting an award of child support.34
The court further reasoned that Virginia Code section 20-109.1
placed three limitations on the parties' right to reach an agreement concerning child support.35 First, the provisions of the
agreement must be in the best interests of the children. 36 Sec24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
(Repl.
36.

Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
Shoup, 37 Va. App. at 244, 556 S.E.2d at 785 (en banc).
Id. (en banc).
Id. at 245, 556 S.E.2d at 786 (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 246, 556 S.E.2d at 786 (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 247, 556 S.E.2d at 786 (en banc).
Id. at 249, 556 S.E.2d at 787 (en banc).
Id. at 249-50, 556 S.E.2d at 788 (en banc).
Id. at 250, 556 S.E.2d at 788 (en banc).
Id. at 250-51, 556 S.E.2d at 788 (en banc); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1
Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
37 Va. App. at 250, 556 S.E.2d at 788 (en banc).
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ondly, the parties' agreement may not prevent a court from exercising its authority to modify the custody and support of the children.37 Finally, the parties may not abrogate by contract their
duty to support the children."
The Virginia Court of Appeals found that the Shoups' Agreement did not circumvent the court's jurisdiction to enforce or
modify child support, nor did it contradict public policy. 39 Concluding that the parties' Agreement was consistent with Virginia
law, the court reversed the trial court.4" The holding clearly
enunciated the need to enforce such agreements:
A rule requiring parents to return to court for approval of a renegotiated amount of child support, as provided in an agreement that has
been affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into an earlier decree,
would undermine the Commonwealth's policy in favor of prompt
resolution of disputes
concerning the maintenance and care of chil41
dren upon divorce.

Therefore, the Agreement providing for both the reduction in
child support upon emancipation of each of the parties' minor
children and the utilization of child support guidelines to determine the amount of child support was enforceable.4 2
The concurrence by Judges Agee and Frank acknowledged the
common use of "self-executing" child support agreements by family law practitioners in Virginia.4 3 Such an agreement is intended
to eliminate the necessity of having the parties return to court
upon the occasion of each child's eighteenth birthday or emancipation.4 4
Practitioners of family law throughout Virginia hailed the reasonableness of the Shoup decision, only to be alarmed three
months later by the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision of
Riggins v. O'Brien.4" In Riggins, the supreme court affirmed the
court of appeals and refused to find the provisions regarding child

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 250-51, 556 S.E.2d at 788 (en banc).
Id. at 252, 556 S.E.2d at 789 (en banc).
Id. at 253-54, 556 S.E.2d at 789-90 (en banc).
Id. at 253, 556 S.E.2d at 789 (en banc).
Id. at 253-54, 556 S.E.2d at 790 (en banc).
Id. at 255, 556 S.E.2d at 790-91 (Agee, J., concurring).
See id. (Agee, J., concurring).
263 Va. 444, 559 S.E.2d 673 (2002).
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support modification in the parties' agreement enforceable.4"
John Riggins, a former football player for the Washington Redskins, was held in contempt by the trial court and judgment was
awarded in favor of his wife for child support arrearages.47 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.48
In 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Riggins entered into an agreement that
specifically set forth the terms of the child support arrangement.4 9 The agreement provided that Mr. Riggins would pay child
support at a set sum until a child reached the age of eighteen,
married, became self-supporting, otherwise emancipated, or
died.5" This payment arrangement was subject to a provision
"that the amount payable hereunder [will] be renegotiated or
submitted to a court for adjudication on the first event of emancipation."5 ' When the parties' eldest child reached the age of eighteen, Mr. Riggins reduced the amount of child support by a quarter.5" He further reduced his child support obligation by another
quarter when the second child became emancipated.53 Court approval was not obtained for either of these reductions in child
support.54 Mr. Riggins made these reduced payments for over six
years without objection from the mother. 5
The trial court found the provision to be void and held Mr.
Riggins in contempt.56 As a result, he was liable for child support
arrearages in an amount exceeding $85,000.00 in addition to an
amount of prejudgment interest exceeding $20,000.00." 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the parties' agreement to consider its validity." The court focused on the language
in the agreement requiring the renegotiation or submission to a
court for adjudication of child support at the time the first child

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

449,
446,
449,
446,

559
559
559
559

S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d

at 676.
at 674.
at 676.
at 674.

(emphasis added).
There were four children born of the marriage. Id.
at 447, 559 S.E.2d at 674.
at 447 n.1, 559 S.E.2d at 674-75 n.1.
at 447, 559 S.E.2d at 675.
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became emancipated.5 9 Highlighting the importance of the welfare of the child, the court held that
[the responsibility of a divorce court to review child support
amounts is necessary to ensure that the child's welfare is adequately
addressed and protected given the circumstances of the parents.
With the exception of terminating a non-unitary support award upon
achieving majority, specifying future changes in the amount of child
support is inappropriate because it does not allow the divorce court
60
to determine child support based on contemporary circumstances.

Considering the Rigginses' agreement, the supreme court reasoned that when the lower court said that "child support could be
renegotiated, the court meant that, upon agreement of the parties, a consent decree could be presented to the court for entry or,
in the event that the parties could not reach an agreement, the
court would adjudicate the matter .... 61 Therefore, the "requirement [was] implicit in the divorce court's decree" and "any
renegotiation would be subject to court approval."6 2 The court concluded that Mr. Riggins was obligated to pay arrears since "the
parties did not obtain court approval for their renegotiations."6 3
This decision seemed to turn upon the conclusion that if
renegotiations had taken place, a consent decree had to follow. As
highlighted in the dissent, the express language of the decree did
not seem to require entry of a consent decree upon renegotiation.64
In the dissenting opinion, Justices Koontz and Kinser opined
that the court of appeals probably would not find the Rigginses'
child support provision to be void considering its recent decision
of Shoup v. Shoup.6 5 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that any renegotiation had to be subject to court approval.66 Relying on the express language of the decree, the dissent found that the parties were directed to renegotiate child

59. Id.
60. Id. at 448, 559 S.E.2d at 675.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 449, 559 S.E.2d at 676.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 450, 559 S.E.2d at 676 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 449, 559 S.E.2d at 676 (Koontz, J., dissenting) (citing Shoup v. Shoup, 37
Va. App. 240, 556 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 2001) (en banc)). It is interesting to note that the
majority never referenced Shoup. See id. at 446-49, 559 S.E.2d at 673-76.
66. Id. at 450, 559 S.E.2d at 676 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
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support upon the specific emancipation of the children.6 7 The dissent also reasoned that such emancipating events were not inconsistent with the best interests of the children and not in violation
of any statute.68 The analysis focused on the express language of
the divorce decree, which provided that in the absence of a successful renegotiation of child support, the disjunctive "or" provision applied.69 The parties either successfully renegotiated the
child support or, failing to renegotiate, would adjudicate the matter.7" The majority, according to the dissent, "effectively converts
the disjunctive 'or' into the conjunctive 'and.' 71 The dissenting
justices would have reversed and remanded the case with instructions to determine whether or not renegotiations had occurred.72
Can Riggins be reconciled with Shoup? One difference between
the two opinions is that the agreement in Shoup provided for a
method of calculating the new child support obligation upon the
emancipation of a child by referencing the utilization of the statutory guidelines.7 There is no reference to the guidelines in
Riggins. The authors of this article feel that this is a potentially
critical difference.
The fathers in both cases appear to have reduced child support
unilaterally without the approval of the mothers, creating an additional ambiguity. 74 The renegotiation is implied in Riggins as
the court remarked that the mother failed to object to the reduced
payments for over six years.7 5 Similarly, in Shoup, the father
made a unilateral reduction with no objection by the mother for
four years.7 6 Mrs. Riggins prevailed on appeal, however, because
the renegotiation required court approval,7 7 while Mrs. Shoup lost
because the unilateral reduction in support did not require court

67. Id. at 450, 559 S.E.2d at 677 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 450, 559 S.E.2d at 676 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Koontz, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Koontz, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Koontz, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 450, 559 S.E.2d at 677 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
73. Shoup v. Shoup, 37 Va. App. 240, 245 n.1, 556 S.E.2d 783, 785 n.1 (Ct. App. 2001)
(en banc).
74. Riggins, 263 Va. at 447 n.1, 559 S.E.2d at 674 n.1; Shoup, 37 Va. App. at 245-46,
556 S.E.2d at 786 (en banc).
75. 263 Va. at 447 n.1, 559 S.E.2d at 674 n..
76. See Shoup, 37 Va. App. at 245-46, 556 S.E.2d at 786 (en banc).
77. Riggins, 263 Va. at 449, 559 S.E.2d at 676.
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approval.7" Certainly, the Riggins court latched on to the court
adjudication language,79 while the Shoup court latched on to the
guidelines language."0 It remains to be seen whether these two
cases will be reconciled or whether Riggins is considered to have
overruled Shoup. Legislation may be introduced in the 2003 session to address this problem.
2. Deviation from Guideline Support
Other decisions of lesser interest concerning child support in1 and Newland v. Newland. 2 Each of these
clude Smith v. Mann"
unpublished decisions addresses unique issues: the maintenance
of child support for a disabled child 3 and the requirement for
payment of private school tuition. 4
In Smith, the parties had a child over the age of eighteen who
suffered from schizophrenia and other mental disorders. 5 The
mother sought a continuation of child support payments for this
child after he turned age eighteen." The court noted that Virginia
Code section 20-124.2(C) provides for the payment of child support beyond the age of eighteen for a child who is "severely and
permanently mentally or physically disabled." 7 The child's treating psychiatrist testified about the son's mental disorders, 8 yet
could not opine as to whether the son's mental disability was
permanent.8 9 Based on the psychiatrist's explanation that the
son's condition would neither abate nor improve unless new
treatments became available in the future, the court of appeals
found that the trial court had properly determined that the

78. Shoup, 37 Va. App. at 254, 556 S.E.2d at 790 (en banc).
79.
263 Va. at 448-49, 559 S.E.2d at 676.
80. 37 Va. App. at 254, 556 S.E.2d at 790 (en banc).
81. No. 0206-01-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 703 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
82. No. 0907-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 152 (Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
83. Smith, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 703, at *3.
84. Newland, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 152, at *2-3.
85. Smith, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 703, at *3.
86. See id. at *1-2.
87. Id. at *3; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.
2002).
88. Smith, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 703, at *3-5.
89. Id. at *5.
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child's mental disability was permanent in nature.9" Therefore,
the trial court was correct in ordering the father to continue to
pay child support payments.91
In Newland, the court of appeals reversed the trial court for
modifying child support to include the costs of private school tuition for the children.92 The trial court had added the cost of private school tuition as a childcare expense to the child support
guideline presumptive amount." The court of appeals held it was
error to include the children's private school tuition as a childcare
expense.9 4 The trial court must first determine the presumptive
guideline amount figure, which it had failed to do.9" If, thereafter,
the presumptive guideline figure is unjust or inappropriate, the
trial court could make written findings to that effect and deviate
from the presumptive child support amount.96
In conclusion, the most important cases regarding support are
the Riggins and Shoup decisions regarding self-executing provisions for child support modification. These cases leave some room
for doubt as to the efficacy of such provisions. To be truly selfexecuting, the statutory guidelines should be referenced and utilized by the terms of the parties' agreement. However, court approval of such modifications may still be required.
B. Legislative Changes
1. Gross Income for Self-Employment Tax
The most significant bill passed by the General Assembly in
the area of child support amended the definition of "gross income."97 Before this amendment, only wage earners qualified to
90. Id. at *6-7.
91. Id. at *7. It should be noted that the onset of such disabilities must commence
while the child is still eligible for support in order for the support to continue after the
child's emancipation. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum.
Supp. 2002) (stating that a court may order continuation of support for any child with a
severe disability).
92. Newland v. Newland, No. 0907-01-04, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 152, at *1 (Ct. App.
Mar. 12, 2002) (unpublished decision).
93. Id. at *5.
94. Id. at *7.
95. Id. at *7-8.
96. Id. at *8.
97. See H.B. 1034, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 8,
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have the self-employment tax deducted from their gross income."
The General Assembly, in an effort to give equality to selfemployed individuals, changed the definition of "gross income" to
allow self-employed individuals to deduct an amount equal to
one-half of any self-employment tax.99 After October 1, 2002, both
self-employed individuals and wage earners will be treated
equally when it comes to the definition of gross income and the
impact of the self-employment tax. °°
2. Healthcare Coverage
The General Assembly passed a somewhat technical and complicated bill dealing with healthcare coverage for children in child
support proceedings. 10 1 First, Senate Bill 470 amends Virginia
Code section 63.1-250.112 Section 63.1-250 now provides that a
"reasonable cost" for health insurance shall be an amount "that
03
does not exceed five percent of a parent's gross income." If the
healthcare coverage is unavailable at a reasonable cost, the Department of Social Services must refer the dependent children to
the Family Access to Medical Insurance Security Plan.0 4 Further,
the statute requires the department to "use the National Medical
Support Notice (NMSN) to enforce the provision of healthcare
coverage through an employment-related group health plan pursuant to a child support order if available at a reasonable cost,"
unless an order stipulates to an alternative healthcare coverage. 0 5 Finally, the notice of child support must include a statement that healthcare coverage shall be required if available at a
reasonable cost.'0 6 This amendment demonstrates the intent of
the General Assembly to secure healthcare coverage for as many
children as possible.
2002, ch. 650, 2002 Va. Acts 587) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp.
2002)).
98. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001), with id. § 20-108.2(C)
(Cum. Supp. 2002).
99. Id. § 20-108.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002)

100. Id.
101. See S.B. 470, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 17,
2002, ch. 844, 2002 Va. Acts 584) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-250, -250.1, -250.2, 250.3:1, -252.1 (Repl. Vol. 2002)).
102. See id.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
104. Id. § 63.1-250.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
105. Id. § 63.1-250.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
106. Id. § 63.1-250.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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III. CHILD CUSTODY

A. Case Law
1. Presumptions of Law
Practitioners have been unable to predict the outcome of cases
where a custodial parent requests the relocation of the children.
Last year, the family law article of the Annual Survey discussed
the case of Cloutier v. Queen,10 7 where the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that it would not be in the
children's best interest to relocate with their mother, upon her
remarriage, to Pennsylvania-four hours away from their father
in Virginia."'8 This year, in Goodhand v. Kildoo, °9 the court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court permitting the
mother, upon her remarriage, to relocate to Arizona with the parties' minor child while the children's father remained in Fairfax
County."0 The parents shared joint custody of their youngest
child, who was ten years old, pursuant to the custody agreement."' The mother had primary physical custody during the
school year and the father had primary physical custody during
the summer, as well as visitation during the school year." 2 The
mother married a man from Arizona who relocated to Virginia for
three months, but then returned to his job in Arizona. 3
The trial court made specific findings for each of the enumerated factors found at Virginia Code section 20-124.3."' In weighing the factors in the best interests of the child, the trial court
found that the mother thought that shared custody was "horrible"; additionally, the court found that the mother had been the

107. See 35 Va. App. 413, 545 S.E.2d 574 (Ct. App. 2001); Elizabeth P. Coughter &
Ronald R. Tweel, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Family Law, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 651,
670 (2001).
108. 35 Va. App. at 429-30, 545 S.E.2d at 582.
109. 37 Va. App. 591, 560 S.E.2d 463 (Ct. App. 2002).
110. Id. at 595, 560 S.E.2d at 464.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 596, 560 S.E.2d at 465.
114. Id. at 597-98, 560 S.E.2d at 465-66; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Repl. Vol.
2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002) (providing a history of the factors to be examined by the court
"[i]n determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody or visitation
arrangements").
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primary caregiver of the child.115 The trial court also found that
the ability of each parent to coordinate and resolve disputes was
a problem. 1 6 Despite the testimony of a child psychologist that
the child wished to remain in Virginia, that the child was well attached to both parents, and that both parents were actively inthe mother's petivolved in the child's life, the trial court granted
1 17
Arizona.
to
child
the
with
tion to relocate
The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected the father's argument
that when parties share custody of their child, there should be a
presumption of harm when one parent proposes to move the child
far away.11 The court of appeals confirmed that "Virginia law
simply requires the court to consider and weigh the necessary
factors in order to determine both whether a change in custody
[would be] in the best interest of the child, and whether relocation [would be] in the best interest of the child."1 19 The law also
requires that the moving party bear "the burden of proving that
the relocation will not cause a 'substantial impairment' to the relationship between the non-moving parent and the child." 2 ° Ultimately, the court of appeals found that there was no evidence
that the benefits of the father's relationship with his daughter
could not be maintained while she lived in Arizona during the
school year.12 1 In fact, the evidence "suggested that the relationship might not be affected at all." 2
More recently, in the unpublished decision of Banit v. Banit,'2 3
the trial court was affirmed on appeal in granting the mother's
request to relocate with the parties' son to California.1 24 The critical issue in Banit was whether the shared custody arrangement
of alternating weekends with each parent had had a detrimental
effect upon the child.'2 5 An independent psychologist and school
psychologist each testified that the child was depressed, learning

115. Goodhand, 37 Va. App. at 597-98, 560 S.E.2d at 465-66.
116. Id. at 598, 560 S.E.2d at 466.
117. Id. at 596, 602, 560 S.E.2d at 465, 468.
118. Id. at 601, 560 S.E.2d at 467.
119. Id. at 602, 560 S.E.2d at 468.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 602-03, 560 S.E.2d at 468.
122. Id. at 603, 560 S.E.2d at 468.
123. No. 3237-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 263 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id. at *4.
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disabled, emotionally disturbed, and suffered anxiety as a result
of the shared custody schedule.1 26 The evidence also established
that the strong bond between the father and son would not be
harmed by the move to California since the child would be with
his father for the summer and other vacations.1 27
The precedent presented by these cases remains unclear: the
stated facts in Goodhand, where the mother was permitted to relocate, 2 ' do not appear to be nearly as persuasive as the facts in
Cloutier, where the mother was not allowed to relocate.'2 9 The
lesson from these cases is that trial courts are afforded great discretion in relocation cases and are rarely overturned on appeal.
In another custody case decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals, Carter v. Carter,130 the court refused to adopt a presumption in favor of a biological parent over an adoptive parent.1 3' In
this case, the Carters divorced after the stepfather had adopted
the mother's biological five-year-old son whom he had helped
raise since birth.'32 When the parties separated, a child custody
order awarded custody of both children to the father. 33 This order
was subsequently upheld by the circuit court.' 34 On appeal, the
court refused to adopt the mother's argument that the law should
recognize a presumption of custody in her favor since she was the
biological parent.' 35 The court of appeals noted that Virginia Code
section 63.1-219.22 provides that an adoptive child is the child of
the person who adopted him or her and has the same rights and
privileges as a biological child of the adoptive parent.'3 6

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
2002).

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *6.
37 Va. App. 591, 595, 560 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Ct. App. 2002).
35 Va. App. 413, 429-30, 545 S.E.2d 574, 582 (Ct. App. 2001).
35 Va. App. 466, 546 S.E.2d 220 (Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 468, 546 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469, 546 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 468, 546 S.E.2d at 221; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.22 (Cum. Supp.
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2. Joint Custody
Finally, in Tignor v. Tignor,'37 the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed an award of custody in which the parents shared joint
physical custody and the children shifted between the parents'
residences on a weekly basis. 3 ' The mother objected to this equal
sharing of physical custody.13 9 The court of appeals found that the
trial court properly accepted the testimony of the father's expert
4°
witness who endorsed such a custody arrangement.' This case is
significant, as it is contrary to the experience of the authors of
this article for a court to award shared physical custody over the
objection of a parent when there is an inability of the parents to
communicate harmoniously regarding their children.'
4 2 from those
Tignor differs considerably in its conclusions
43 The Tignor court imposed a shared physical
found in Banit.'
custody arrangement on the parents,'44 while the Banit court set
aside such an arrangement.' 45 In Tignor, however, it remained to
be seen what effect the shared custody arrangement would have
on the children, 1 46 while in Banit, the mother established to the
court's satisfaction the harmful effect the arrangement had on
her son.' 47

In conclusion, the case law regarding child custody issues
seems to indicate a lack of enthusiasm by the court of appeals to
adopt any presumptions as a matter of law in relocation cases or
otherwise. Moreover, the discretion of the trial court in these
cases is not likely to be set aside.

137. No. 2995-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 384 (Ct. App. June 26, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id. at *8.
140. Id. at*13.
141. Id. at *4. The commissioner, whose recommendations were adopted by the trial
court, had concluded in Tignor that the parents were not able to communicate effectively
with each other. Id.
142. Id. at*1-2.
143. Banit v. Banit, No. 3237-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 263, at *2 (Ct. App. Apr. 30,
2002) (unpublished decision).
144. Tignor, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 384, at *1-2.
145. Banit, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 263, at *5.
146. See Tignor, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 384, at *11-12.
147. Banit, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 263, at *2-3.
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B. Legislative Changes
1. Admissibility of Mental Health Records
During the 2002 session, the General Assembly passed important legislation in the area of mental health records. The most
significant bill to pass related to the admissibility of therapy records of parties to a custody or visitation proceeding.148 Various
bar groups and the Virginia Psychological Association ("VPA")
have been discussing addressing this area of the law for a number of years. The VPA wanted to promote its therapy by restricting access to its medical records and by prohibiting mental health
professionals from testifying in custody and visitation cases.149 On
the opposite side, lawyers and judges have traditionally sought
the discovery and introduction of this evidence because of the
mandated statutory criteria found in Virginia Code sections 20107.1, 20-107.3, and 20-124.3. These statutes require courts to
consider the mental health of the parties in custody and visitation hearings. 150 Therefore, lawyers and judges have been accustomed to breaching this area of confidentiality because the patient has placed his or her mental condition at issue." 1 Even
though bills concerning this issue failed to pass in previous sessions, this year the Association outmaneuvered the state bar with
the passage of House Bill 1001.152 Nevertheless, a strong lobbying
effort by certain bar groups persuaded Governor Mark Warner to
delay the implementation of this new statute until July 1, 2003.13
One can expect a vigorous fight in the 2003 session for a repeal of
this statute.
Specifically, the bill provides that in any case in which custody
or visitation is an issue in the circuit or district court, "the records concerning a parent, kept by any licensed mental health-

148. H.B. 1001, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 17, 2002,
ch. 881, 2002 Va. Acts 733) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
149. For more information on the VPA, see their Web site at http://www.vapsych.org
(last modified Sept. 11, 2002).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002); Id. § 20107.3(E)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002); Id. § 20-124.3(2) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum.
Supp. 2002).
151. Id. § 8.01-399 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
152. H.B. 1001, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 17, 2002,
ch. 881, 2002 Va. Acts 733) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
153. Id.
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care provider and any information obtained during or from therapy shall be privileged and confidential."'54 Further, the mental
healthcare provider shall not be required to testify on behalf of
the parent or any of the parent's adult relatives without the written consent of the parent. 5 ' This restriction would also apply to
depositions.'56 Next, if the mental health provider does testify,
the testimony is limited to the custody and visitation case in
question and the healthcare provider's records and notes are not
admissible in the court proceeding.'57 Accordingly, a healthcare
provider can testify only if the patient has requested or permitted
him or her to do so.
Fortunately, the General Assembly permitted exceptions to
this restriction. 5 ' The first is in cases of abuse or neglect as defined by Virginia Code section 63.2-1509.' The second exception
applies to situations where the healthcare providers are conducting an independent mental health evaluation pursuant to a court
order. 160
If this law is not repealed next year, it remains to be seen how
courts will receive the testimony and documents necessary to assess the mental health of the parties as required by the statutes
mentioned above. Once a clearer explanation of this statutory criteria is provided to the General Assembly, the legislative body
may well take a different view in 2003.
2. Jurisdiction to Order Psychological Tests
There has been considerable debate among lawyers and judges
over the past few years about the authority or jurisdiction of the
juvenile and circuit courts to order psychological or custody
evaluations. Various articles have been written about the issue,
some of which are conflicting.' 6 ' The General Assembly has now

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Cum. Supp. 2002). Title 63.1 of the Virginia Code was repealed effective October 1, 2002 and reenacted as Title 63.2.
160. Va. H.B. 1001.
161. See, e.g., Timothy B. Beason & J.M. Carlberg, The Legal Basis for Appointing Independent Psychological Evaluatorsin Custody Court, FAM. L. NEWS, Spring 2001.
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provided clarity for such orders in juvenile court. 16 2 By a new
statute passed this year, the juvenile and domestic relations
courts now have clear authority to order such psychological
evaluations of "any parent, guardian, legal custodian or person
standing in loco parentis to the child."1 6 3 The courts also have discretion to apportion the cost of these evaluations.16 4 In addition,
the bill provides that the juvenile courts have the authority to or165
der drug testing on such parties as it deems appropriate.
The obvious unanswered question is why is this authority only
given to the juvenile courts and not to the circuit courts? It is our
belief that this question will be answered next year when corresponding legislation will be introduced granting circuit courts
this same authority. There certainly is no rationale or logic for
only the juvenile courts to have this power.
3. Termination of Parental Rights
In the past there has been a considerable amount of case law
and debate about what efforts need to be made by the Department of Social Services before it is appropriate for a court to terminate parental rights. 6 6 In an effort to lighten the burden on
the Department of Social Services so that it would be easier to
terminate parental rights and place a child for adoption, the General Assembly amended two statutes.'6 7 The newly amended statutes enunciate additional circumstances where no effort to
reunite the child with the biological parent is required. 6 ' A reunion is not necessary when a parent has subjected a child to "aggravated circumstances" or has abandoned the child under cir162. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15(G)-(H) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
163. Id. § 16.1-278.15(G).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 16.1-278.15(H).
166. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Richmond Dep't of Soc. Serv., No. 1224-01-2, 2002 Va. App.
LEXIS 41 (Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2002) (unpublished decision) (reversing trial court's termination of parental rights after evidence failed to show that the Department of Social Services
offered any services to father); Marlowe v. Chesterfield/Colonial Heights Dep't of Soc.
Serv., No. 1913-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 104 (Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2000) (unpublished decision) (finding that Department of Social Services satisfied the requirement of reasonable
efforts by providing group therapy and classes on independent living and childcare); Fields
v. Hopewell Dep't of Soc. Serv., No. 1936-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 58 (Ct. App. Feb. 8,
2000) (unpublished decision) (terminating parental rights and holding that Department of
Social Services did not fail to make efforts because whereabouts of parent unknown).
167. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-281(B), -283(E) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
168. Id.
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cumstances that would justify termination of the parental
rights. 69 "Aggravated circumstances" include such actions as
"torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic or severe sexual
abuse."1 70
4. Violation of Visitation Orders
Many non-custodial parents have lobbied the General Assembly for years to make interference with visitation a crime while
other non-custodial parents have lobbied to make the penalty
stiffer for such interferences. These simultaneous efforts have
been successful because this year the General Assembly amended
Virginia Code section 18.2-49.1(B) to increase the penalties for
willful violations of orders regarding custody and visitation. 71
This amendment changes the penalty for a first offense from a
Class IV misdemeanor to a Class III misdemeanor, which means
that a person is now subject to incarceration.1 72 Further, a third
offense within twenty-four months of the first conviction shall be
a Class I misdemeanor, which means that a person could receive
up to one year in jail and/or a $2,500 fine. 73 Only time will tell
whether the threat of incarceration for a first offense will usher
in a new series of criminal proceedings in the Commonwealth.

IV.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT

A. Case Law
1. Cohabitation
As reported in last year's article, 174 family law practitioners eagerly awaited the rehearing decision in Rubio v. Rubio.17' The en
banc decision in Rubio v. Rubio 76 vacated the panel decision and

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. § 16.1-281(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
Id.
Id. § 18.2-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Coughter & Tweel, supra note 107, at 687-88.
33 Va. App. 74, 531 S.E.2d 612 (Ct. App. 2000) [hereinafter Rubio I].
36 Va. App. 248, 549 S.E.2d 610 (Ct. App. 2001) (en banc) [hereinafter Rubio III.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:155

reversed the judgment of the trial court remanding it for further
proceedings. 177 Rubio I caused great consternation among the legal community because it found that Virginia Code section 20109(A) as amended re-established the Act, which would limit the
scope of the statute to "suits filed on or after July 1, 1998, seeking
initial support orders." 7 ' Thereafter, the Virginia General Assembly modified section 20-109(A).' 79 Rubio II acknowledged that
section 20-109(A), which terminates spousal support upon the
payee's cohabitation with another person in a relationship analogous to marriage for a year or more,"' ° did not apply when the
parties' stipulation agreement was not merged into the divorce
decree.'
The Virginia Court of Appeals found that there is a distinction
among property settlement agreements which were: (1) merely
affirmed; (2) incorporated; or (3) incorporated without merger in
the subsequent divorce decree."8 2 The court reasoned that an "affirmed" agreement is enforceable only as a contract; an "incorporated" agreement is merged and enforceable only as a decree, and
an "incorporated but not merged" agreement is enforceable as ei1 3
ther a contract or a decree.

1

In Rubio II, the parties' stipulation agreement provided that it
would not be merged into the divorce decree.'84 The divorce decree
did not order merger.18 1 Without merger, the agreement remained
enforceable as a contract and unaffected by the subsequent cohabitation amendment to Virginia Code section 20-109(A).8 6 The
parties' agreement could not be modified by the court as Virginia
Code section 20-109(C) prohibits such modification.8 7 Hopefully,
the Rubio fiasco is over at last.

177. Id. at 250, 549 S.E.2d at 611 (en banc).
178. Rubio I, 33 Va. App. at 76-77, 531 S.E.2d at 613.
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
180. Id.
181. 36 Va. App. at 255, 549 S.E.2d at 613 (en banc).
182. Id. at 254, 549 S.E.2d at 613 (en banc).
183. Id. (citing Hering v. Hering, 33 Va. App. 368, 373, 533 S.E.2d 631, 633-34 (Ct.
App. 2000)).
184. Id. at 255, 549 S.E.2d at 613 (en banc).
185. Id. (en banc).
186. Id. (en banc).
187. Id. (en banc).
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In Tanger v. Tanger,8 8 a finding of cohabitation was established and spousal support was terminated."l 9 In that case, the
wife was living in an apartment in her employer's residence.19 °
She and her employer, however, testified that they did not have a
sexual relationship and did not sleep in the same bed. 9 ' The evidence established that the wife lived in her employer's residence
for four or five years and that the parties' adult child also lived
there for two or three years.19 2 The wife paid neither rent nor utility bills.19 3 The wife did, however, use her employer's credit card
to pay for her food, dental care, and gasoline when driving her
employer's car.194 She also paid for her athletic club membership
and her dog's veterinary bills with this same credit card.' 95 She
and her employer traveled to Europe several times.196 The wife,
however, did not perform certain other marital duties-she did
197
not cook or clean for her employer, nor did she do his laundry.
She said that she paid for her own food. 98 Finally, she claimed
that she reimbursed her employer for her credit card purchases
with cash but had no records to establish those cash reimbursements. 99 The trial court found that the lack of a sexual relationship was "nearly irrelevant" on the issue of cohabitation under
these facts.20 0
2. Imputation of Income
This year the Virginia Court of Appeals also revisited Joynes v.
Payne. °1 In Joynes I, the court of appeals remanded the decision
to the trial court for a determination of child support based on the

188.
cision).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

No. 2017-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 472 (Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2001) (unpublished deId. at *15-16.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
35 Va. App. 386, 545 S.E.2d 561 (Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Joynes I].
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wife's imputed income." 2 In the second appeal, Joynes v. Payne,0 3
the court of appeals stayed its Joynes I decision and affirmed the
trial court's decision in its entirety.2 °4 The court of appeals agreed
that the commissioner had properly considered, for purposes of
spousal and child support, the wife's actual part-time earnings
when determining her ability to earn an income and for purposes
of imputing income to her.20 5 The court found that an alleged
agreement by the parties that the wife would work part-time
while raising the children was relevant. 0 6 It was also appropriate
for the commissioner to consider the wife's subsequent termination of her part-time employment as a negative non-monetary
contribution and as a factor leading to the dissolution of the marriage. °7 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly considered the wife's actual part-time earnings for determination of support even though she had terminated that
job.20 8 Moreover, the job termination was considered a negative
factor in equitable distribution.2 9
The Virginia Court of Appeals also addressed the issues of voluntary underemployment and imputed income in Peverell v. Eskew.2 10 The father in this case sought to impute income to the
wife for purposes of modifying child support when one of the parties' two children was placed in his primary physical custody.2 11
The mother had remarried and the children's father contended
that many of her daily ordinary living expenses were paid for by
her current husband. 212 The court of appeals found that the trial
court had failed to make any factual finding as to why the payments made on the mother's behalf by her current husband were
excluded from calculating her gross monthly income.21 3 The court

202. Id. at 412, 545 S.E.2d at 574.
203. 36 Va. App. 401, 551 S.E.2d 10 (Ct. App. 2001) [hereinafter Joynes Ill.
204. Id. at 411, 551 S.E.2d at 15.
205. Id. at 422, 551 S.E.2d at 20.
206. Id. at 425-26, 551 S.E.2d at 22.
207. Id. at 430, 551 S.E.2d at 24.
208. Id. at 422, 551 S.E.2d at 20.
209. Id. at 430, 551 S.E.2d at 24.
210. No. 0060-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 242 (Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
211. Id. at *4.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *9-10.
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remanded this particular issue for additional findings of fact by
the trial court. 214
The father also argued that the mother was voluntarily underemployed.2 5 The trial court established that the mother was previously employed in a full time position from which she voluntarily resigned.2 16 The mother then had the burden of proving that
her underemployment was not "voluntary."21 7 The court of appeals found credible evidence to affirm the trial court's finding
that her underemployment was not voluntary based on the evidence that she had "cogent reasons" for being employed parttime.21 " Those reasons included the mother's care of her son who
was recovering from an automobile accident, the care of her
daughter who was in counseling, and having to deal with "multiple investigations by child protective services" upon the father's
complaint and allegations of sexual abuse by the stepfather. 219
The mother was also recovering from her own personal medical
problems. 220 Upon these facts, the court of appeals held that the
"evidence did not warrant an imputation of income to the
221
mother."
22 2 the Virginia Court of Appeals considered
In Carr v. Carr,
whether a wife was voluntarily unemployed by working in a parttime, as opposed to a full-time, position.2 23 The parties were married for twenty years before they separated, and the wife had not
worked outside the home for fifteen years prior to their separation.2 24 The evidence revealed "that the parties' youngest child [a
teenager], was having significant behavioral and emotional issues
caused by the divorce." 22' For that reason, the court of appeals affirmed the commissioner's and trial court's finding that it was
appropriate for the wife not to work full-time under those circum-

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
cision).
223.
224.
225.

Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *12.
No. 1848-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 279 (Ct. App. May 7, 2002) (unpublished deId. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id.
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stances.226 The husband also failed to present any evidence of the
availability of full-time jobs for his wife. 227
In conclusion, under Carr and Peverell, the party seeking to
impute income carries the burden of proof.228 Carr further notes
that this burden includes proving that jobs suitable for the underemployed party are actually available in the community.229
Additionally, Joynes II and Carraffirm that a trial court's failure
to limit spousal support to a specific period of time would not be
considered an abuse of discretion.23 ° Under current Virginia law,
a lengthy marriage and an underemployed spouse with needy
children provide sufficient evidence to sustain an award of permanent spousal support.
3. Arrearages
In Bazzle v. Bazzle,23' the Virginia Court of Appeals decided an
interesting case on the issue of spousal support arrearages. In
1982, the husband stopped paying spousal support to his former
wife pursuant to the parties' Property Settlement Agreement
("PSA") which had been incorporated into the parties' 1974 final
divorce decree.2 32 The wife filed a motion for judgment at law
against the husband seeking an award in excess of $429,000.233
She calculated this amount as the present value of the husband's
remaining spousal support obligation due over the balance of her
life expectancy. She obtained a default judgment in the amount of
$429,565.234
In 1984, the husband moved to vacate the default judgment
but was denied his requested relief.23 5 The trial court, however,
226. Id. at *10.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *9; Peverell v. Eskew, No. 0060-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 242, at *10 (Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2002) (unpublished decision).
229. 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 279, at *9.
230. Joynes 11, 36 Va. App. 401, 423, 551 S.E.2d 10, 21 (Ct. App. 2001); Carr,2002 Va.
App. LEXIS 279, at *13.
231. 37 Va. App. 737, 561 S.E.2d 50 (Ct. App. 2002).
232. Id. at 741, 561 S.E.2d at 52.
233. Id.
234. Id. The default judgment provided that if the wife collected the full amount, it was
to be placed in a trust and distributed in monthly installments over thirty-seven years. If
the wife died or remarried any remainder would be repaid to the husband. Id. at 741 n.2,
561 S.E.2d at 52 n.2.
235. Id. at 741-42, 561 S.E.2d at 52.
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enjoined the wife from collecting the default judgment so long as
the husband continued to make his monthly payments and
"maintained a $50,000 letter of credit to her benefit." 236 The husband continued to make the monthly spousal support payments
from 1984 through 1999 and paid off the entire judgment. 23 7 The
husband paid in excess of $429,565 to his former wife.23
In June of 1999, the wife filed a motion to show cause when her
husband, once again, stopped paying the monthly spousal support. 239 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that
the wife had chosen her remedy by electing to sue for the anticipatory breach of the parties' PSA in seeking a total amount of
support due under their contract. 24" However, that amount had
been reduced to a judgment and was paid in full and marked satisfied.2 41 Thus, she could not thereafter "double-dip" and seek a
continuation of spousal support, especially since neither the PSA
nor the divorce decree which incorporated the agreement pro24 2
vided for modification of spousal support.
Bazzle is instructive because it acknowledges an alternative
procedure for collecting support arrearages when spousal support
is a set sum and not modifiable. Of course, the unusual circumstance in this case is that the husband had a default judgment
entered against him. The wife's judgment for prospective spousal
support was insufficient to cover her lifetime need. Therefore, had
she continued to collect support instead of reducing the arrearages and future support to a judgment, she may have fared better
financially. Also, the Bazzle decision does not address the issue of
whether or not a lump sum award for prospective spousal support
is appropriate.

236. Id. at 742, 561 S.E.2d at 52-53.
237. Id. at 742, 561 S.E.2d at 53.
238. Id. In April 1999, the husband's attorney notified the wife that the judgment had
been overpaid and requested its release and satisfaction, which was done. Id. at 742-43,
561 S.E.2d at 53.
239. Id. at 743, 561 S.E.2d at 53.
240. Id. at 747, 561 S.E.2d at 55.
241. Id. at 742-43, 561 S.E.2d at 53.
242. Id. at 744, 561 S.E.2d at 53.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:155

4. Miscellaneous Issues

Another issue addressed in recent decisions was the necessary
proof of voluntary underemployment when establishing spousal
support.243 In Grover v. Grover,244 the husband had been ordered
to pay spousal support in a divorce action in which his wife was
awarded a fault-based divorce on the grounds of adultery.245
Three years after the divorce decree, the husband petitioned the
trial court "to reinstate the case and reduce his spousal support"
obligation.2 46 The husband sought to establish that the wife was
voluntarily underemployed and that her circumstances had materially changed.2 47 The trial court found, however, that the husband failed to present evidence that there was a job available in
the area where the wife lived and in her field of employment experience.248 The evidence indicated that the wife had last worked
as a medical technician over twenty years ago.2 49 The husband

presented evidence relating to employment opportunities in other
geographic areas based solely on advertisements and Internet research. ° The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that the husband failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the wife was voluntarily underemployed and
could currently obtain employment as a medical technician
within a reasonable distance from her home.251
The decision of Mabie v. Mabie. 2 confirmed that the reservation of rights for spousal support provision found in Virginia Code
section 20-107.1(D) is mandatory.253 In this case, the parties were
married for over twenty-five years, and the wife requested permanent spousal support in the divorce action.25 The trial court,

243. See, e.g., Grover v. Grover, No. 1544-01-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 613 (Ct. App.
Nov. 6, 2001) (unpublished decision).
244. Id.
245. Id. at *2.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *3.
248. Id. at *5. The wife resided in Bedford, Virginia. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *5-6.
252. No. 0729-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 164 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
253. Id. at *4-5; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.
2002).
254. Mabie, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 164, at *2.
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however, awarded her spousal support for a period of only six
years. 25" The wife also requested the reservation of right to an
award of spousal support. 256 The Virginia Court of Appeals found
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the award of limited
duration spousal support.2" 7 It did find error, however, on the reservation of rights for spousal support, and the court reversed and
remanded the matter.2 5 The court found that there was no evidence in the record to rebut the presumption that a reservation of
right for spousal support should run for the period specified in
the statute, i.e., "fifty percent of the length of time between the
date of the marriage and the date of separation." 25 9 The parties
had been married twenty-eight years and, thus, the reservation
should have been for at least fourteen years. 26" The court of appeals held that the trial court's reservation of right for support for
a six-year period concurrent with the award of spousal support

was in error.

261

In conclusion, the cases regarding spousal support have put to
rest the issue of the retroactive application of the statutory termination of spousal support upon proof of cohabitation by the
payee. If the spousal support is court ordered, or if the parties'
agreement merged into a subsequent decree, termination of
spousal support will occur pursuant to Virginia Code section 20109(A).262 Further, evidence of cohabitation does not have to include evidence of sexual intimacy if there is sufficient evidence of
cohabitation and financial interdependence. 263 Finally, the imputation of income for determination of support will focus on the actual employment circumstances of the payee in his or her place of
residence.2 64

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
2002)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.

260. Id.
261. Id. at *4-5.
262. Rubio H, 36 Va. App. 248, 255, 549 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 2001).
263. Tanger v. Tanger, No. 2017-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 472, at *14 (Ct. App. Aug.
7, 2001) (unpublished decision).
264. Carr v. Carr, No. 1848-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 279, at *10 (Ct. App. May 7,
2002) (unpublished decision); Grover v. Grover, No. 1544-01-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 613,
at *5-6 (Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2001) (unpublished decision).
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B. Legislative Changes
There were no legislative changes in the spousal support area.

V. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

A. Property Settlement Agreements
In Flanary v. Milton,26 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia rendered a decision on the issue of the enforceability of a parties' oral
agreement.26 6 The court reviewed an oral property settlement
agreement made during a deposition pending divorce. 267 The oral
agreement between the parties was recited into the record by the
parties' attorneys during the wife's deposition.26 The agreement
provided that the wife agreed to accept a lump sum payment of
$45,000, which would release her interest in her husband's assets
and her interest or right to any additional future spousal support.2 69 This agreement never took effect because the husband
died shortly thereafter and the divorce proceeding was consequently dismissed. 270
After her husband's death, the wife filed a petition as the surviving spouse pursuant to Virginia Code section 64.1-151.1.271 The
executor of the husband's estate sought to estop the widow from
pursuing her statutory claim.2 72 The supreme court reasoned that
since the parties' agreement was not in writing, it was not a valid
agreement pursuant to the Premarital Agreement Act, 273 which
also applies to marital agreements.2 4 The court recognized that
agreements made in contemplation of settling litigation can be

265.

263 Va. 20, 556 S.E.2d 767 (2002). For further discussion of this case see J. Rod-

ney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 357, 377-78 (2002).
266. 263 Va. at 21, 556 S.E.2d at 768.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 21-22, 556 S.E.2d at 768.

269. Id. at 22, 556 S.E.2d at 768.
270.

Id.

271. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
272.

Flanary, 263 Va. at 22, 556 S.E.2d at 768.

273. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -155 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
274. Flanary,263 Va. at 24, 556 S.E.2d at 769.

20021

FAMILY LAW

enforced even though they are not written. 275 However, Virginia
Code section 20-155, regarding marital agreements, does not exempt such agreements from the requirement of being in writing. 276 The court held that the wife's oral agreement was subject
to the provisions of Virginia Code section 20-155.277 Since the
agreement was not in writing nor signed by the parties as required by that statute, the wife had not effectively waived her
surviving spouse or elective share rights to the husband's augmented estate.27" Flanary, therefore, explicitly overrules the Vir9
ginia Court of Appeals case of Richardson v. Richardson."
Many practitioners include a provision in their standard property settlement agreement requiring that the payor of support
maintain life insurance so long as the payor is responsible for
2°
paying support. In Metcalf v. Metcalf, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, which had found the husband in
contempt for failing to abide by the life insurance provision requirement.2"" The trial court found the property settlement
agreement to be ambiguous when it stated that the husband had
to continue to maintain the wife as the primary beneficiary on his
"existing" life insurance for as long as he was responsible for paying spousal support. 2 2 At the time the parties entered into the
28 3 He
agreement, the husband had three life insurance policies.
28 ' Although the trial
later retired and one of the policies ceased.
court found the word "existing" to be ambiguous, it held the husband in contempt for failing to fulfill the obligation to maintain at
5
least $100,000 worth of life insurance.2
On appeal, the court of appeals found that, assuming the
agreement was ambiguous, it was error to hold the husband in

275. Id. at 23, 556 S.E.2d at 769.
276. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cure. Supp. 2002).
277. Flanary,263 Va. at 24, 556 S.E.2d at 769; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Repi.
Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
278. Flanary, 263 Va. at 24, 556 S.E.2d at 769; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Repl.
Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
279. Flanary, 263 at 23, 556 S.E.2d at 769; see also Richardson v. Richardson, 10 Va.
App. 391, 392 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1990).
280. No. 1208-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 208 (Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2002) (unpublished decision).
281. Id. at *3-4.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id.
285. Id. at *4.
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contempt.2 86 It was not clear from the language of the agreement
that the husband was required to maintain a minimum level of
$100,000 worth of life insurance.8 7 Therefore, he did not violate a
clearly defined and imposed duty and his actions could not constitute contempt. 2 88 The contempt finding and an award of attorney's fees in favor of the wife was thus reversed. 289
B. Property Characterization
In another equitable distribution decision, Roberts v. Roberts,29°
the Virginia Court of Appeals found that real estate which originally had been titled in the wife's parents' names, but was encumbered by a debt in the joint names of the parties, had not
been transmuted into marital property. 291 The lien on the property was in the name of the husband and wife but had been paid
by the wife's parents who resided on the property.29 2 The court of
appeals found that the cosigning of the loan on the real estate by
the parties and the purchase of a replacement dishwasher for the
parents' use did not amount to "personal efforts" that were significant, nor did they result in substantial appreciation of the
property.29 3
The court of appeals noted that the trial court and commissioner failed to identify the correct net equity on certain real estate and to value all the marital property. 294 Moreover, the lower
court and commissioner did not identify the evidence that supported the equitable distribution award. 295 The court of appeals
found clear error, and stated, "while the court is not expected to
do a law review article on the rationale for the equitable distribution award, it needs to give some identifiable written ration-

286. Id. at *5.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *6 (citing Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8, 10-11, 235 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977)).
289. Id. The case was remanded to ensure that any counsel fees paid by the husband
under the trial court's order were returned to him. Id.
290. No. 0095-01-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 588 (Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
291. Id. at *10-13.
292. Id. at *11-12.
293. Id. at *12.
294. Id. at *13-14.
295. Id. at'*20-21.
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ale."296 The court continued to criticize the lower court, stating
that, "the failure to classify and value all the assets does not allow for verification that the court's intended division was properly done."2 97 Therefore, it remains clear that in rendering an equitable distribution award, the trial court or commissioner has an
obligation to identify in some way the facts that support the
award.
Virginia Code section 20-107.3(A)(3)(f) provides that jointly titled property is presumed to be marital property unless it is re2 9 In Blevins v.
traced to separate property and is not a gift.
2 99 the wife rebutted the presumption with evidence that
Blevins,
the jointly titled $85,000 certificate of deposit was not intended to
0
be a gift to her husband but to remain her separate property.
The wife's parents acquired the certificate of deposit prior to the
parties' marriage and it was intended to be used for the wife's
education. 30 1 During the marriage, this certificate of deposit was
02
transferred to the wife and her father. Once the father became
ill, the certificate was retitled jointly in the wife and husband's
name; however, "the wife testified that she did not intend to
30 3
make [the certificate of deposit] a gift to her husband." Additionally, the trial court was able to trace the $85,000 principal as
her separate property.30 4 Therefore, the Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision that the certificate of deposit
was the wife's separate property and that she did not intend to
gift it to her husband. 305
In Saxton v. Saxton, °6 the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed a
division of marital assets awarding eighty percent to the wife and
twenty percent to the husband.30 7 Such an unequal division was
upheld because the marriage lasted for twenty-two years and the
296.
297.
298.
299.
cision).
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at *21.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(f) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
No. 2297-01-3, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 281 (Ct. App. May 7, 2002) (unpublished deId.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *8-11.
at *8.

at *8-9.
at *10-11.

306. No. 3179-01-1, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 262 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002) (per curiam)
(unpublished decision).
307. Id. at *12-13.
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husband had committed pre-separation adultery."' The husband
had argued unsuccessfully that the unequal award was punitive. °9 In practice, such an unequal distribution of assets does not
often occur, even in cases of adultery or other marital fault.
In summary, the past year has not resulted in any equitable
distribution decisions which significantly affect Virginia law.
These decisions are more anecdotal than precedential.
C. Pensions
In Torian v. Torian,31 ° the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed
the division of a defined benefit Virginia Retirement System
("V'RS") pension plan. 31 1 The court confirmed that there are two
methods for valuing and dividing such a pension.32 The first
method is the deferred distribution approach, requiring division
at the time benefits are paid on a monthly basis to the retiree. 3
The second method is the immediate offset approach, requiring a
present value determination and division of assets immediately. " 4 The VRS pension in this case was a defined benefit plan,
not a defined contribution plan.' As a defined benefit plan, it required a determination of the present value of the marital share
of the benefits, if there was to be an offset.1 6 The statutory requirement to determine present value for pensions was deleted a
decade ago.31 7 Upon the wife's request of an immediate division of
the pension, the court of appeals confirmed that the party requesting the division under an immediate offset approach had the
burden of proving the present value of the pension. 31" The wife
failed to present sufficient evidence of that value, giving only her
statement as to the present value of the pension.3 19

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
S.E.2d
319.

Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *4.
38 Va. App. 167, 562 S.E.2d 355 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 171, 562 S.E.2d at 358.
Id. at 176, 562 S.E.2d at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177 n.2, 562 S.E.2d at 361 n.2.
Id. at 177, 562 S.E.2d at 361; see also Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 618, 359
546, 551 (Ct. App. 1987).
Torian, 38 Va. App. at 179, 562 S.E.2d at 361.
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The court made it very clear that the present value need not be
determined if the parties are requesting a deferred distribution of
the marital share of the pension until a future time when the retiree receives the benefits.3 2 ° Therefore, when a party wants a
share of the monthly benefits, if and when the monthly benefits
are payable, he or she does not bear the burden of proving the
present value of that asset. 321 The court of appeals found that the
trial court was correct in not making a finding of fact as to the
present value of the VRS pension when the wife requested an
immediate offset, and the court was also correct in failing to
award her any of this asset.322
Of additional interest in the Torian case was the fact that the
parties had been married for over twenty-six years and the court
awarded the wife spousal support for a term of merely seven
years.32 3 The court of appeals found that such an award was not
an abuse of discretion because in seven years the wife could draw
from her personal IRA, one of the husband's sources of income
would be depleted by that time, and she would only be 591/2 years
old at that time.324 Presumably, she was viewed as being employable on a full-time basis at that age.325
D. Legislative Changes
There were no legislative changes in the equitable distribution
area.

VI. GROUNDS OF DIVORCE
6
One decision handed down recently, Bchara v. Bchara" establishes, to some degree, the proof required for spouses who claim
to have lived separate and apart for the statutorily prescribed
32 7
time while living in the same household. In this case, the wife

320. Id. at 177, 562 S.E.2d at 360.
321. Id. at 177, 562 S.E.2d at 361.
322. Id. at 178, 562 S.E.2d at 361.
323. Id. at 182, 562 S.E.2d at 363.
324. Id. at 183, 562 S.E.2d at 363.
325. Id.
326. 38 Va. App. 302, 563 S.E.2d 398 (Ct. App. 2002).
327. Id. at 305, 563 S.E.2d at 399; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(A)(9)(a) (Repl. Vol.
2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
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claimed that the parties had been separated since January
2000.32 The husband denied such a separation, claiming that at
that time they were still continuing to live as a married couple
within their mutual marital residence. 2 9 The Virginia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the separation did
occur in January 2000."30
The trial court based its determination on several factors, including the wife's discovery of a videotape indicating the husband's infidelity.331 Upon that discovery, she moved the husband's
personal possessions out of the marital bedroom and into the
guest room of the house where the husband continued to sleep. 32
At that time, she also stopped attending family functions with
her husband and his family.333 She no longer attended church
with her husband and stopped depositing money into their joint
checking account.3 4 She did continue to purchase groceries, cook,
do laundry, and clean the house.335 She also repeatedly asked the
husband to leave the marital residence; however, he refused.336
This evidence of separation was confirmed by a corroborating
witness who testified that she had visited the house on a weekly
basis and observed the parties living in separate bedrooms. 37 She
also testified that the wife had told her that she and her husband
were no longer "a couple." The wife also testified that she intended to live separate and apart from her husband as of January
2000.338 The lack of cohabitation was also established by testimony that the parties no longer engaged in sexual intercourse.339
The Virginia Court of Appeals found that "continuing to share
food and keep a clean house are not behaviors that, as a matter of
law, require finding that the parties are living together."340 The

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
(1922)).

Bchara, 38 Va. App. at 311, 563 S.E.2d at 402.
Id. at 310, 563 S.E.2d at 402.
Id. at 318, 563 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 310, 563 S.E.2d at 402.
Id.
Id. at 311, 563 S.E.2d at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Chandler v. Chandler, 132 Va. 418, 428-31, 112 S.E.2d 856, 860-61
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court concluded, therefore, that the wife intended to permanently
discontinue the marital relationship at the time she moved her
husband's belongings into the guest room.34 ' This case is instructive for practitioners who have clients that are eager to establish
a separation for purposes of divorce, but have not physically relocated from the marital residence.
VII. PROCEDURE
A. Pendente Lite Decrees
There were several recent decisions, including one from the
Supreme Court of Virginia, regarding procedure in divorce cases.
In Whiting v. Whiting,34 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed
the Virginia Court of Appeals in finding that a pendente lite de43
cree remained in effect after entry of the final divorce decree.
The court of appeals had found that the decree, which had been
entered in violation of Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:13, was
voidable. 34 4 The supreme court found, however, that as a voidable
decree, it must be challenged within the twenty-one-day rule
found in Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:1. 34 ' However, on appeal
to the supreme court, this issue was not raised.3 46 Therefore, the
divorce decree remained in full force and effect and the pendente
lite decree awarding spousal support applied only during the
pendency of litigation prior to entry of the final decree.3 47
B. Arbitration
In Marks v. Marks,3 4 the Virginia Court of Appeals reviewed
the application of the Uniform Arbitration Act 349 to an antenuptial agreement.3 5 ° In the antenuptial agreement the parties pro-

341. Id.
342. 262 Va. 3 (2001).
343. Id. at 4.
344. Id. at 3; see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:13.
345. Whiting, 262 Va. at 3; see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1.
346. Whiting, 262 Va. at 4.
347. Id.
348. 36 Va. App. 216, 548 S.E.2d 919 (Ct. App. 2001).
349. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.01 to -581.016 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
350. Marks, 36 Va. App. at 223, 548 S.E.2d at 922.
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vided that any future dispute resolution that could not be mediated would be put to an arbitrator for final determination.351 The
husband excepted in multiple ways to the arbitrator's award.3 52
No hearing was ever requested by the husband for his motion to
reconsider the arbitrator's award and no ruling was ever made on
this motion by the court which approved the arbitrator's award.353
The husband was found to have failed to abide by the rules set
forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act for challenging the errors of
an arbitrator's award and for obtaining judicial review. "' The
case was affirmed on appeal and remanded for a determination of
the wife's attorney's fees and costs. 3
C. Sanctions
In Travis v. Finley,356 the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court which had dismissed the mother's petition for
modification of custody.5 7 An earlier decision involving the same
parties had reversed the trial court's award of custody to the
mother, granting her petition to move with the child to Ghana. 8
In the current appeal, the trial court ruled that it would dismiss
the mother's petition to modify custody and her petition to show
cause because she had failed to answer discovery. 5 9 The mother
had pled her Fifth Amendment privilege in response to certain
discovery requests.36 ° The court of appeals, in its most recent decision, found in favor of the mother, holding that the trial court
did not have the authority to dismiss the mother's petition as a
sanction under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:12 because that
Rule's sanctions did not apply until an order was entered and violated.36 ' In this case, there was no order, but merely a petition be-

351. Id. at 219, 548 S.E.2d at 920.
352. Id. at 221-22, 548 S.E.2d at 921-22.
353. Id. at 220, 548 S.E.2d at 921.
354. Id. at 226-27, 548 S.E.2d at 924; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.08 (Repl. Vol. 2000
& Cum. Supp. 2002).
355. Marks, 36 Va. App. at 231, 548 S.E.2d at 926.
356. 36 Va. App. 189, 548 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001).
357. Id. at 193, 548 S.E.2d at 908.
358. Finley v. Travis, No. 3060-97-2, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 522, at *3-4 (Ct. App. Oct.
6, 1998) (unpublished decision).
359. Travis, 36 Va. App. at 194, 548 S.E.2d at 909.
360. Id. at 196, 548 S.E.2d at 910.
361. See id. at 197, 548 S.E.2d at 910; see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:12.
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fore the court.3 6 2 Citing Virginia Code section 8.01-223.1, the
court also found that since the mother had claimed her Fifth
Amendment privilege in response to discovery requests, the trial
court was barred from dismissing her petition. 63
In Peverell v. Eskew,364 discussed previously, 365 it should be
noted that the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court finding that the trial court violated the father's due
process rights.36 6 The court of appeals had entered an order sua
sponte prohibiting the parties from placing any further matters
on the trial court's docket without its prior consent.3 67 The trial
court's "pre-docketing review requirement" was found to be a violation of the parties' due process rights established under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.36 The
court of appeals found, however, that "[t]here is nothing in the record before us evidencing that either party has abused its right to
access the trial court's docket in warranting the pre-docketing review. For example, there is no showing of abuse of process or the
filing of frivolous pleadings. '36 9 Therefore, the trial court was reversed in its attempt to limit future court filings.37°
D. Preservationof Jurisdiction
In Smith v. Smith I the Virginia Court of Appeals found that
the wife had properly preserved the trial court's jurisdiction to
award equitable distribution after entry of its final divorce decree. 2 The parties had been divorced by decree in 1998. 373 The
decree provided that it was final as to the parties' divorce and
that their marriage was dissolved forever 3 74 The decree in perti-

362. Travis, 36 Va. App. at 197, 548 S.E.2d at 910.
363. Id. at 202, 548 S.E.2d at 912; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000
& Cum. Supp. 2002).
364. No. 0060-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 242 (Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
365. See supra text accompanying notes 210-21.
366. Peverell, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 242, at *13.
367. Id.
368. Id. at *14.
369. Id. at *16 (citations omitted).
370. Id.
371. 38 Va. App. 113, 562 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 2002).
372. Id. at 114, 562 S.E.2d at 330.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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nent part also stated that "matters requiring equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to Virginia Code section 20107.3 are hereby deferred for further adjudication as allowed by
Virginia Code section 20-107.3. " 375
Discovery took place for thirty-four months after the entry of
this divorce decree.376 The wife moved for an equitable distribution hearing in January 2001.17 ' The husband filed a plea of lack
of jurisdiction and a motion to quash which was granted by the
trial court.37 The court of appeals found that the wife had properly requested a decision of equitable distribution in the third
paragraph of her answer to the complaint. 379 The divorce decree
contained her reservation of the right to equitable distribution
and, therefore, the trial court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to award equitable distribution under these circumstances.8 o
E. Adoption
Over the past year, two important cases regarding the adoption
of children whose parents were in prison were decided. 8 1 In
Crockett v. McCray,8 2 the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the
final order of adoption upon the natural mother's objection.8 3 The
natural mother placed the child with the adoptive parents when
the child was four months old. 3 4 The child had been living with
the adoptive parents for four years when they petitioned for
adoption. 3" The natural mother had spent most of the child's life
in prison. 6 She prevailed in her objection to the adoption on the
grounds that the reports and orders entered in the matter demonstrated that the statutory visits by the Department of Social

375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 116-17, 562 S.E.2d at 331.
380. Id.
381. See Crockett v. McCray, 38 Va. App. 1, 560 S.E.2d 920 (2002); Reed v. Hersam,
No. 0466-01-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 483 (Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2001) (unpublished decision).
382. Crockett, 38 Va. App. 1, 560 S.E.2d 920.
383. Id. at 2-3, 560 S.E.2d at 921.
384. Id. at 3, 560 S.E.2d at 921.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 4, 560 S.E.2d at 921.
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Services did not appear to have taken place." 7 Virginia Code section 63.1-219.19 requires three visits by the Department of Social
Services. 38" The court of appeals found that it was not error, however, for the trial judge to refuse on remand the mother's request
for visitation with the child. 389
In Reed v. Hersam,39 0 another case involving an inmate's objection to adoption, the Virginia Court of Appeals in its per curiam
decision affirmed the adoption, finding that the incarcerated father withheld his consent to the adoption contrary to the best interests of the child.39 1 It appears from these two cases that an inmate who is not involved in his or her child's life could lose his or
her parental rights.
F. Miscellaneous
Dorer v. Siddiqui3 9 2 makes it clear that the circuit court's concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to Virginia Code section 20-79(c)
does not cease when it transfers enforcement of its support orders
to the juvenile and domestic relations court.3 93 The circuit court
has concurrent jurisdiction to rule on any show cause proceedings
filed with it despite the transfer of enforcement to the lower juvenile court.3 94 Therefore, the circuit court may transfer to the juvenile court any case where there is concurrent jurisdiction. 395
In conclusion, on procedural matters this past year, the appellate opinions confirmed that pendente lite decrees expire with entry of a final decree.39 6 The Virginia Court of Appeals also ruled
that sanctions against a party asserting a Fifth Amendment
privilege are inappropriate.3 97 Finally, if the parties elect to util-

387. Id. at 6-8, 560 S.E.2d at 922-23; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.19 (Cum.
Supp. 2002).
388.

VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.19.

389. Crockett, 38 Va. App. at 9-10, 560 S.E.2d at 924.
390. No. 0466-01-04, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 483 (Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
391. Id. at *1.
392. No. 0974-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2002) (unpublished
decision).
393. Id. at *4; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79(c) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
394. See id. at *5-7; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79(c).
395. See id. at *5; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79(c).
396. See supra Part VII.A.
397. See supra Part VII.C.
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ize binding arbitration, then the Uniform Arbitration Act must be
followed. 8 '
G. Miscellaneous Legislative Changes
1. Interlocutory Appeals
In the field of family law, many pendente lite or interlocutory
orders can have a significant or dramatic impact on the outcome
of a case. On its face, a new statute allowing interlocutory appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals seems to change that result.39 9 However, closer scrutiny of the exact terms of this statute

indicate that it will be rarely utilized in the family law arena.
This amendment allows for an interlocutory appeal to the court
of appeals in limited circumstances. 400 A "party may file in the
circuit court a statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal should be permitted."" 1 This statement shall set
forth a concise analysis of the rules of court, statutes, or case law
determinative of the issues.0 2 Further, the statement must request a trial court to certify that the issue involves a question of
law upon which:
(i) there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, (ii) there is
no clear controlling precedent point ... (iii) determination of the issues will be dispositive of a material aspect of the proceeding currently pending before the court, and (iv) the court and the parties
agree it is in the parties' best interest to seek an interlocutory appeal. 403

It is worth noting that the consent of both the litigants and the
court is required, thereby greatly reducing the chances of numerous appeals in the family law area.0 4 It is likely that subject matter jurisdictional issues or the validity of agreements will be the
issues most likely to be heard pursuant to this new statute.
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See supra Part VII.B.
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Procedurally, once there is a certification by the trial court, the
petitioner has ten days to file a petition with the court of appeals.4"' The standard for the appellate court is a discretionary
one.40 6 No petitions or appeals shall stay the proceedings in the
circuit court unless the circuit court or the court of appeals so orders.4 °7 Therefore, the practitioner need not worry that a typical
pendente lite order granting temporary custody, spousal support,
child support, attorney's fees, and exclusive use and possession of
a marital residence will be granted an interlocutory appeal.
2. Protective Orders
Various statutes were amended by Senate Bill 518,408 which
provides in essence that the name, address, telephone number
and place of employment of a person protected by a protective order shall not be disclosed by a law enforcement agency, attorney
for the Commonwealth, Clerk of Court, nor employees of any of
the above, unless required by law or necessary for law enforcement purposes or permitted by the court for good cause. 40 9 The intent of this provision seems to provide additional anonymity and
security for the person who is protected by such an order and to
insure to the extent possible that the person is not harassed or
abused in any way.
3. Impact of Domestic Violence Orders on a Concealed Weapon
Permit
A dispute arose concerning the use of concealed weapon permits when a domestic violence protective order has been issued.
This confusion was clarified when the General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 18.2-308.1:14.41 ° The statute subjects a person who has a concealed weapons permit to the restric-

405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. S.B. 518, Va. Gen. Assembly (Ex. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 2002, ch.
508, 2002 Va. Acts 179) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253, -253.1, -253.4, -279.1,
17.1-272 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
409. Id.
410. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:4 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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tions of a domestic violence protective order. 411 Further, this person is prohibited from carrying any concealed weapon and shall
surrender the permit to the court entering the protective order for
the duration of such order.412
4. Family Abuse and Marital Rape Expanded
Most people will view the changes made to the penalties for
domestic violence and marital rape as beneficial. 413 However,
some will view them as a dangerous governmental incursion into
the lives of married couples and will also bemoan the potential for
frivolous complaints. First, some have considered this to be some
of the most important legislation to be passed in this last session.
Many women's groups have long fought for an expansion of the
definition of marital rape and finally achieved success this year.
The amendment removes the provision that marital rape cannot
occur unless the spouses are living apart or bodily injury occurs.

414

Further, the legislation redefines "family abuse" to include reasonable apprehension of bodily harm rather than "serious" bodily
harm. 415 The trend in the Commonwealth and in the country has
been to take a more vigorous standing against family abuse. This
is a laudable goal, however, it must be realized that on occasion
overreaching and strategic complaints can be made. Strategic
complaints arise when one is attempting to seek advantage in
civil litigation. It certainly is more difficult to prove serious bodily
harm than a reasonable "apprehension" of bodily harm. Our
courts will no doubt define reasonable apprehension of bodily
harm quite differently. Herein lies the genesis of potential mischief. Hopefully, the courts will take precautions to insure that
targets of such claims are not the subject of unwarranted proceedings.

411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 2002), and id. § 18.2-61 (Cum.
Supp. 2002), with id. § 16.1-228 (Repl. 1999), and id. § 18.2-61 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
414. Id. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2002). For further discussion of this legislation, see
Julie McConnell, et al., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Criminal Law, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 45, 86 (2002).
415. Id. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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5. Right to Breast Feed
Legislation was passed that guarantees the right of any woman
41 6
to breast feed her child at any location on state property. Although the authors of this article are strong advocates of breast
feeding, it is unclear as to why it was necessary to pass a bill to
this effect. We certainly hope that there was no opposition to it.
Nonetheless, the young mothers of the Commonwealth should
feel relieved.
6. Computer Trespass and Violations
This amendment should fall under the heading of "no good
deed goes unpunished." One of the authors of this article convinced the VBA Coalition Committee on Family Law Legislation
to submit an amendment 417 to the present computer trespass
statute because of past experiences. Numerous circuit court cases
have involved a spouse's discovery and downloading of e-mails on
the home computer from the other spouse to his or her paramour. 411 Several judges from Northern Virginia, experienced in
computer litigation, opined that such activities may be a violation
of the criminal computer trespass statute.4 19 It was, therefore,
thought that a revision of the statute was needed in order to clarify that one spouse was not guilty of a crime for merely downloading e-mail letters evidencing the other spouse's infidelity. In our
mind, this was akin to discovering a box of love letters locked
away in a closet. Certainly, no one would consider that discovery
to be a crime, and the elevation of computers to a deified status
by the General Assembly and courts seems to be unwarranted
and unwise.
Unfortunately, when the amendment was submitted to the
General Assembly to exempt one spouse from being prosecuted
for such an activity, the General Assembly amended it so that it
only applied to a parent supervising or monitoring the e-mail of

416. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-1147.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
417. H.B. 304, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 2002,
ch. 195, 2002 Va. Acts 198) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002)).
418. See, e.g., Streeseman v. Streeseman, No. CH98-485, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 116
(Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2000) (Spotsylvania County) (unpublished decision).
419. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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their child. 42" The problem with limiting the amendment in this
way is that a misguided court could draw a "negative inference"
that the statute does in fact apply to a spouse who discovers email on the home computer from the other spouse to a paramour.
Hopefully, the courts of the Commonwealth will not take this
draconian view and draw this negative inference.
VIII. CONCLUSION

This year did not see any major changes in the area of family
law. The Virginia Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Virginia have confused practitioners on the issue of enforceability of
self-executing child support agreements of divorcing parties. Next
year may provide clarification.
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